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Essay: I Choose, You Decide: Structural Tools for 
Supreme Court Legitimation 
Jeremy N. Sheff* 
 
Efforts to rein in partisanship (or the perception thereof) on the 
Supreme Court tend to focus on reforms to the selection, appointment, or 
tenure of Justices.  I propose a different (and perhaps complementary) 
reform, which would not require constitutional amendment.  I propose that 
the selection of a case for the Court’s discretionary appellate docket should 
be performed by a different group of judicial officers than those who hear 
and decide that case.  The proposal leverages the insight of the “I Cut, You 
Choose” procedure for ensuring fair division—only here, it manifests as “I 
Choose, You Decide.”  This proposal, rather than attempting to correct any 
supposed institutional deficiency that exacerbates the effects of partisanship, 
instead seeks to create a structure of checks and balances by pitting 
partisanship against partisanship. 
 
 
I.INTRODUCTION: AN INFLECTION POINT ......................................... 162 
II.ARE PARTISAN COURTS A PROBLEM? ........................................... 163 
III.A NEW STRUCTURAL PROPOSAL ................................................. 165 
IV.IMPLEMENTING “I CHOOSE, YOU DECIDE” ................................. 168 
V.ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS ......................................... 170 
VI.CONCLUSION: WHICH IS THE GREATER EVIL? ............................ 175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University. 
SHEFF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/2019  2:18 PM 
162 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:161 
I. INTRODUCTION: AN INFLECTION POINT 
The Senate’s categorical refusal to consider any nomination by 
President Barack Obama to fill the Supreme Court vacancy opened by the 
death of Justice Antonin Scalia,1 followed by the abolition of the filibuster 
for Supreme Court nominations2 and the razor-thin confirmation vote on the 
nomination of then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh to that Court,3 marks an 
inflection point in half a century of partisan mobilization around the staffing 
of America’s super-legislature.4  Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s intemperate 
display and partisan diatribe at his high-profile confirmation hearing5 
brought partisan politics from the subtext of Supreme Court confirmation 
battles up to the surface for all to see.6  With a long-wished-for five-vote 
ideological majority of the Court now secured by a minority political party7 
and sealed by the nominee’s own partisan outburst at his confirmation 
hearing, the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a trusted arbiter 
of legal and constitutional disputes of national importance—which has been 
 
 1  Letter from Charles E. Grassley et al., Senate Judiciary Comm., to Mitch McConnell, 
Senate Majority Leader (Feb. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/YV5P-NHHT (“[W]e wish to 
inform you of our intention to exercise our constitutional authority to withhold consent on 
any nominee to the Supreme Court submitted by this President to fill Justice Scalia’s 
vacancy.”). 
 2  Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for 
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/ASS3-3G9U. 
 3  See 164 CONG. REC. S6,697 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2018) (confirming the nomination by a 
vote of 50 to 48, with Senator Daines absent and Senator Murkowski withdrawing her 
previously cast “nay” vote). 
 4  See generally Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme 
Court as Super-Legislature, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1601 (2015). 
 5  Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/MKE4-9MBL (statement of Judge Brett Kavanaugh) (“This whole two-week 
effort has been a calculated and orchestrated political hit, fueled with apparent pent-up anger 
about President Trump and the 2016 election.  Fear that has been unfairly stoked about my 
judicial record.  Revenge on behalf of the Clintons and millions of dollars in money from 
outside left-wing opposition groups.”); Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Sexual 
Assault Hearing, Judge Kavanaugh Testimony, C-SPAN (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2PEF-CK7M.  
 6  In the interest of full disclosure: I am one of thousands of law professors who signed 
an open letter opining that this display was evidence that then-Judge Kavanaugh is unfit to 
serve in the office which he now holds; I believe Christine Blasey Ford, and I also opposed 
the nomination on other grounds, including but not limited to partisan grounds.  The Senate 
Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh. Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/ECH9-YFAD.  
 7  The President who nominated Kavanaugh received millions fewer popular votes in the 
2016 presidential election than his opponent, and the senators who voted to confirm Brett 
Kavanaugh’s nomination represented millions fewer citizens than the senators who voted 
against confirmation.  Philip Bump, Senators Representing Less than Half the U.S. Are About 
to Confirm a Nominee Opposed by Most Americans, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9ZX4-LL4Y. 
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slowly eroding for decades8—has been dealt another serious blow. 
There are some who will welcome this development—who think that 
the Supreme Court’s perceived institutional legitimacy has always been a 
sham, and that the democratic deficits of judicial review far outweigh any 
redeeming value of the institution.9  Others, however, will mourn the Court’s 
lost legitimacy, and some of them are looking for ways to salvage it.10  This 
Essay adds a novel proposal that can be used as a structural principle to assist 
in that effort, whether alone or as a complement to other extant proposals.  
The proposal is simple: the selection of a case for the Supreme Court’s 
discretionary appellate docket should be performed by a different group of 
judicial officers than those who hear and decide that case. 
II. ARE PARTISAN COURTS A PROBLEM? 
The past few years have put a spotlight on the political nature of 
courts—and particularly of the Supreme Court—in a way not seen since the 
heyday of American Legal Realism and the court-packing crisis of the New 
Deal era.11  But this level of attention does not necessarily mean that judicial 
partisanship is a bad thing.  The most plausible way to frame the partisanship 
of the Supreme Court in positive (and perhaps Burkean) terms is to view the 
Court as an institutional mechanism to tie social changes of constitutional 
magnitude to relatively long time-scales by means of life tenure.  John 
Fabian Witt recently predicted (and critiqued) this type of structural 
argument: 
 
 
 
 
 8  See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confide 
nce-Institutions.aspx (last visited Sept 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/89P4-UMQZ].  
 9  See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A 
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES xvii (2012) (“Because the Court functions much 
more like a political veto council than a court of law. . . the Supreme Court’s power to 
overturn the important decisions of other governmental officials should be seriously 
reevaluated. . . [W]e should be honest about how the council is structured and actually 
operates.”). 
 10  See generally, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 
129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
 11  Compare MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002) (examining the court-
packing crisis); L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1933-1934) 
(summarizing the advance of American Legal Realism during the 1930s by one of its 
contemporaneous critics); with SEGALL, supra note 9 (identifying and critiquing episodes of 
political and ideological decisionmaking by the Supreme Court); Epps & Sitaraman, supra 
note 10 (“Recent events have seriously called into question the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court. . . . From one perspective, this conflict is a welcome one. Americans have not been 
sufficiently critical of the Supreme Court’s role in our society over recent decades.”). 
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[The n]ew justification (& critique) of the Court won’t be about 
law.  The new justification will be that [the Supreme] Court lets 
political coalitions extend their authority beyond their electoral 
successes.  For good & for ill.  That’s all.  [The question] is 
whether majorities will put up with it.  I suspect not.12 
This argument has two possible readings.  The first, and more cynical, 
reading is that evanescent electoral majorities in the political branches may, 
through luck, skill, and strategic persistence, use the Court’s power to harden 
their preferred policies into constitutional rules, making those policies more 
durable than any electoral majority can be expected to be.  Call this the 
“Smash and Grab” argument.  The second (and more favorable) reading is 
that the increasing but unaligned durations of official tenure held by 
Presidents, Senators, and Supreme Court Justices ensure that, for legal and 
social changes of constitutional magnitude to be made, the proponents of 
such changes will likely have to prevail consistently in electoral politics over 
a long enough period of time to build a Supreme Court majority, which may 
be a reliable indicator of democratic legitimacy.  Call this the “Persistent 
Majorities” argument. 
The Smash and Grab argument is anti-democratic in a way that seems 
exactly contrary to the most common contemporary justification for the 
judiciary’s countermajoritarian tendencies—the protection of constitutional 
rights (and particularly the rights of minorities) against the passions of 
illiberal electoral majorities.13  But I also have doubts about the Persistent 
Majorities argument, precisely because it depends on electoral victories in 
the most anti-majoritarian of our national electoral institutions: the Senate 
and the Electoral College.  (This same doubt may inform Witt’s question 
“whether majorities will put up with” Supreme Court authority framed in 
these terms—it seems to assume that the Court will inevitably be staffed by 
a popular minority.)  In short, partisan alignment of the Supreme Court with 
an ideologically cohesive popular minority seems to me to be a real problem 
for anyone who believes that the law ought to have some democratic 
accountability. 
Still, I remain sympathetic to the notion that the courts play an 
important role in protecting unpopular minorities—particularly those whose 
identity or membership is constructed by reference to immutable 
characteristics rather than ideological cohesion—from invidious 
discrimination at the hands of an inflamed majority.  Therefore, in the 
absence of democratic reform of the Senate or the Electoral College, some 
 
 12  John Fabian Witt (@JohnFabianWitt), TWITTER (Sept. 28, 2018, 10:51 AM), 
https://perma.cc/TR76-DDPV.  
 13  See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 107 (2002). 
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structural tool to blunt the partisan impulses of the Justices—and especially 
the effects of such impulses on the Court’s legitimacy—seems to be called 
for even in the absence of some fully-worked-out theory of the legitimacy of 
judicial review in general.  In short, if partisanship is not a virtue to be 
operationalized in the structure of the federal judiciary, it is a vice that must 
be managed by that structure. 
But if partisanship in the exercise of the judicial power is a problem, 
what is the solution?  Either judges must become non-partisan—precisely 
the fantasy that the confirmation wars of the past half-century have 
shattered—or their partisanship must be somehow tamed, checked, or 
cabined—perhaps by partisanship itself.  This latter option is particularly in 
keeping with American constitutional theory—the principle that “[a]mbition 
must be made to counteract ambition,” thereby “supplying, by opposite and 
rival interests, the defect of better motives[.]”14  That principle suggests we 
need a structural understanding of the role of an admittedly partisan federal 
judiciary in the broader American constitutional framework, and of partisan 
Supreme Court Justices within a partisan federal judiciary. 
III. A NEW STRUCTURAL PROPOSAL 
Tools to address judicial partisanship have been proposed in the past, 
and are enjoying another moment in the limelight in the wake of the 
Kavanaugh confirmation process.  Most notable are term-limits proposals of 
the type that have been bandied about before,15 and have been given renewed 
attention by a number of law professors organized under the “Fix the Court” 
banner.16  Their most recent proposal, the “Regularization of Supreme Court 
Appointments Act,” would stagger Supreme Court appointments at regular 
two-year intervals and rotate Justices out of active service after eighteen 
years.17  There have also been panel proposals that would have Supreme 
Court appeals heard by a (possibly random) subset of eligible Justices rather 
than the full bench.18  One such proposal would staff such panels from an 
expanded Supreme Court based on the “I Cut, You Choose” procedure 
adapted from game theory: the parties would propose panels to one another 
in an iterated process, which would end when one party agrees to a panel 
 
 14  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 15  See generally Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme 
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006). 
 16  See FIX THE COURT., https://www.fixthecourt.com (last visited July 27, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/7N43-MJJJ].  
 17  Letter to Congress on the Regularization of Supreme Court Appointments Act of 2017, 
FIX THE COURT. (June 29, 2017), https://fixthecourt.com/2017/06/tlproposal/ 
[https://perma.cc/UCB2-D56Q]. 
 18  See generally Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme 
Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009). 
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assembled by the other party.19 
While each of these proposals implicitly recognizes partisanship in the 
judiciary as a vice rather than a virtue, they all seek merely to limit the 
durability or consequences of a partisan tilt in the Supreme Court—to accept 
partisanship as a biasing influence but to limit its duration (via term limits) 
or effects (by letting litigants choose their Justices).  None of these proposals 
would attempt to check judicial partisanship with judicial partisanship.  My 
proposal does.  It draws on the same game-theoretic insight as the iterated-
panel-selection proposal (while implementing that insight more directly), 
and could well be layered over any of these or other proposals.  I propose 
that the selection of a case for the Court’s discretionary appellate docket 
should be performed by a different group of judicial officers than those who 
hear and decide that case. 
At its most basic, the proposal would: (a) commit the question of 
selecting and certifying appeals for Supreme Court review to one group of 
judicial officers, and (b) commit the hearing and disposition of appeals so 
certified to a different group of judicial officers.  Call the first group the 
“Certiorari Bench” and the second group the “Merits Bench.” 
The Certiorari Bench and the Merits Bench could be divisions of the 
Supreme Court delineated by rule or statute, or the Merits Bench could 
simply be the Supreme Court while the Certiorari Bench could be a separate 
judicial body created or designated by Congress to manage the discretionary 
appellate docket of the Supreme Court.  Indeed, the latter model has some 
analogues in other judicial systems—and even in the history of the federal 
judiciary.  For example, New York affords the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court (the state’s intermediate appellate court) authority to certify 
appeals to the New York Court of Appeals (the state’s court of last resort).20  
And a similar delegation of authority to the judges of the Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeal was among the reforms successfully recommended to 
Congress by Supreme Court Justices prior to the current era of the certiorari 
docket.21  Thus, from 1891 to 1925, the Supreme Court’s appellate docket 
was in fact significantly determined by discretionary Circuit Court 
certification.22 
The key insight of the “I Cut, You Choose” procedure is that the cutter 
has an incentive to limit any unfair partiality in the division of a resource 
 
 19  See generally Ian Bartrum et al., Justice as Fair Division, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 531 (2018). 
 20  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602 (McKinney 2012) (“An appeal may be taken to the court of 
appeals by permission of the appellate division granted before application to the court of 
appeals . . . .”). 
 21  See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1651–52 (2000). 
 22  Id. at 1650–57; Judiciary Act of 1891 (“Evarts Act”), ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 
(1891). 
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between rivals, because any such partiality will likely redound to the benefit 
of the chooser rather than that of the cutter.  By structuring the Supreme 
Court’s work using an analogous “I Choose, You Decide” strategy, this 
proposal has the potential—if implemented effectively—to prevent the most 
polarized partisan issues from being constitutionalized through Supreme 
Court intervention.  In an era when Supreme Court Justices are transparently 
being nominated and confirmed based on their perceived willingness (or 
unwillingness) to enshrine partisan positions on particular issues of policy in 
constitutional law, the power to both decide when to issue a ruling on such 
an issue of law and to then issue that ruling is substantial, and tends toward 
the Smash and Grab model of Supreme Court authority.  Rather than pretend 
that such partisanship is not in play, the “I Choose, You Decide” proposal 
seeks to check and balance such partisanship while maintaining the Supreme 
Court’s role as an authority on questions of federal and constitutional law. 
The key feature of this proposal is that it uses structural design to give 
partisan actors incentives toward moderation in constitutional innovation, 
reaction, or countermajoritarian policymaking through the courts.  So long 
as the partisan policy preferences of the two benches are not strictly aligned 
(an issue I address further below), the Certiorari Bench has an incentive to 
select for adjudication only those cases on which it does not strongly object 
to the partisan preferences of the Merits Bench majority, and the Merits 
Bench majority thus would have no opportunity to enshrine its most 
polarizing policy preferences in constitutional law.  Such polarizing 
questions would then, of necessity, be left to democratic mobilization (or, 
potentially, regional variation—a possibility also discussed below).  This 
leaves unresolved the deep democratic deficiencies of the American 
constitutional system—most notably the composition of the Senate and the 
Electoral College—but at least takes one powerful means of entrenching 
countermajoritarian policies off the table. 
Another nice feature of this proposal is that it does not require the heavy 
lift of constitutional amendment.  The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court is completely within Congress’s control under Article III of the 
Constitution, which provides that “the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make.”23  The Supreme Court itself has 
long interpreted its appellate jurisdiction as being wholly within Congress’s 
control under this constitutional provision.24  Indeed, it was Congress that 
 
 23  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 24  See, e.g., Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 
378 (1893) (“This Court, therefore, as it has always held, can exercise no appellate 
jurisdiction, except in the cases, and in the manner and form, defined and prescribed by 
Congress.”). 
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once provided for discretionary Circuit Court certification of cases for 
Supreme Court appellate review in the Evarts Act,25 and it was Congress that 
created the current certiorari-based regime by passing the so-called “Judges’ 
Bill” in 1925,26 at then-Chief Justice Taft’s persistent request.27  The “I 
Choose, You Decide” proposal thus avoids the constitutional questions that 
attend many other reform proposals, particularly those that might be seen as 
in derogation of a constitutional principle of life tenure for federal judges.28 
IV. IMPLEMENTING “I CHOOSE, YOU DECIDE” 
For my proposal to be effective as a structural check on partisanship in 
the Supreme Court, the two groups of judicial officers it calls for must not 
be aligned in their partisanship.  There are any number of ways of assuring—
or at least raising the probability—of such partisan misalignment between 
the Certiorari Bench and the Merits Bench, though there are obstacles. 
One approach to avoiding partisan alignment across the two Benches 
might seek to regulate the appointments process.  For example, some 
procedure might hypothetically be devised for identifying the partisan 
adversaries of a nominating president in Congress and then conditioning the 
appointment of a Justice to the Merits Bench on giving those congressional 
adversaries the power to identify candidates for appointment to the Certiorari 
Bench (or vice versa).29  But such proposals might founder on either 
constitutional limits regarding the prerogatives of the president and the 
Senate over judicial appointments or practical difficulties in binding senate 
majorities in advance on the exercise of their advice-and-consent powers.  
Moreover, it is not clear that service on the Certiorari Bench would be 
attractive to highly qualified judges and lawyers without the promise of 
someday serving on the Merits Bench. 
Another possible mechanism would be to revert to the pre-1925 
practice of giving Court of Appeals judges the responsibility to certify cases 
from their own appellate dockets for Supreme Court review—with a 
concomitant contraction in the authority of the Supreme Court to certify 
appeals by writ of certiorari.  In this model, the Courts of Appeals would 
collectively serve as the Certiorari Bench.  But the multiplicity of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals makes this solution problematic.  Because we can expect 
 
 25  See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 26  Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
 27  Hartnett, supra note 21, at 1660–1704. 
 28  See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 15, at 859 (“Given that the Appointments 
Clause plainly contemplates a separate office of judge of the Supreme Court, it is hard to see 
how that office could constitutionally be filled for only eighteen years and not for life.”). 
 29  Cf. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 27–36 (proposing a “balanced bench” of 
Supreme Court justices selected on the basis of partisanship). 
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the partisan alignment of at least some Circuit Courts of Appeals to coincide 
with the partisan alignment of the Supreme Court at any given time, giving 
the Courts of Appeals the power to select cases for Supreme Court action 
might simply exacerbate partisan entrenchment in the Smash and Grab mold.  
Circuits that diverge from the partisan tilt of the Supreme Court would tend 
away from certifying appeals, while Circuits that align with the partisan tilt 
of the Supreme Court would be eager to certify appeals.  Again, partisan 
alignment between the Merits Bench and the Certiorari Bench is a distinct 
possibility, and could be expected to lead to partisan selection of cases to be 
decided along partisan lines. 
One particularly elegant alternative solution that avoids all of these 
pitfalls would be to retain authority to certify appeals in a unitary Supreme 
Court divided into a Certiorari Bench and a Merits Bench,30 with service on 
each Bench to be based on length of tenure.  This proposal could be 
integrated into a proposal for fixed terms of active service for Supreme Court 
Justices appointed at regular two-year intervals,31 or any other term-limits 
proposal, though it does not require term limits in order to be effective.  In 
one possible example of such a system, the first several years of a Justice’s 
tenure could be served on the Certiorari Bench, and the remainder could be 
served on the Merits Bench.32 
Moreover, if the Merits Bench were to have an even number of 
justices—as Eric Segall has notably recommended33—it would be fairly easy 
to design the tenure of the Justices in such a way as to make it exceedingly 
unlikely for multiple presidents of any particular party to dominate both the 
Certiorari Bench and the Merits Bench at the same time, regardless of the 
presence or absence of Senate majorities for confirmation.  For example, a 
 
 30  Treating the benches as a single court staffed by the same body of judges, rather than 
two separate courts staffed by different judges, also avoids the objections that ultimately 
defeated the 1972 Freund Committee proposal for a National Court of Appeals to serve as a 
filter on the Court’s appellate docket.  See generally PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(1972) [hereinafter FREUND REPORT].  The constitutional objection—that the proposal would 
divide the appellate authority that the Constitution vests in “one supreme Court” across 
multiple courts—was largely subordinate to a number of prudential and normative objections 
to detracting from the Supreme Court’s role as the sole legal authority of national scope—
some of them raised by the Justices themselves.  See Jack B. Owens, The Hruska 
Commission’s Proposed National Court of Appeals, 23 UCLA L. REV. 580, 583–88 (1976) 
(summarizing reaction to the Freund Committee proposal). 
 31  Letter to Congress on the Regularization of Supreme Court Appointments Act of 2017, 
supra note 17. 
 32  This type of solution would require Justices transitioning from the Certiorari Bench to 
the Merits Bench to recuse (or be disqualified by rule or statute) from considering the merits 
of cases on which they had previously voted while on the Certiorari Bench. 
 33  See generally Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the 
United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018). 
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Court whose Justices serve eighteen-year active terms—six years on a 
Certiorari Bench of three judges followed by twelve years on a Merits Bench 
of six judges—could not see both benches dominated by one party without 
that party controlling the White House for at least four out of five 
consecutive four-year terms, which has happened only twice since 
Reconstruction: the Democratic dominance under FDR and Truman, and the 
Republican dominance of the Nixon-Ford-Carter-Reagan-Bush years.  
Notably, even this danger could be substantially mitigated by extending the 
terms of Supreme Court Justices to twenty, twenty-two, or even twenty-four 
years and expanding the Court to, say, a Certiorari Bench of five or six 
Justices or a Merits Bench of eight Justices. 
Additional tweaks are obviously available, and could further influence 
the likelihood that any particular partisan bloc could dominate both the 
Certiorari and Merits Benches at the same time.  For example, Justices could 
alternate between the two Benches in two- or four- or six-year intervals, or 
Justices could be assigned to the Certiorari Bench after their active terms on 
the Merits Bench expire rather than the other way around.  The latter option 
increases the risk of Justices resigning in favor of lucrative private sector 
employment rather than serving out a term on the Certiorari Bench.  But that 
risk could be turned to an advantage, insofar as it offers a means to address 
the concerns regarding gerontocracy and retirement-timing gamesmanship 
that motivate many term limits proposals without inviting a constitutional 
debate over life tenure.  For example, Justices could begin their terms with a 
fixed number of years on the Certiorari Bench, followed by a fixed number 
of years on the Merits Bench, and then return to the Certiorari Bench for the 
duration of their “good behaviour”34—or for as long as they decline to retire. 
V. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Two substantial objections to the “I Choose, You Decide” proposal are 
apparent and must be addressed.35  The first is that the ability of the Supreme 
Court to set its own agenda via certiorari is in fact an important aspect of its 
constitutional authority, and therefore ought not to be tampered with.  The 
second is that the tendency toward Supreme Court inaction generated by the 
proposal may lead to inconsistencies in the interpretation of federal and 
constitutional law by the various Courts of Appeals, and that such 
 
 34  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 35  These concerns are unique to “I Choose, You Decide” and are thus addressed in this 
essay.  I do not address the various challenges that have been raised to term-limits proposals 
or similar proposals that would distinguish between “active” service and non-active service 
of Justices, both because they have been thoroughly addressed by the advocates and critics of 
such proposals and because “I Choose, You Decide” does not inherently require term limits 
to be effective. 
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inconsistencies may persist for extremely long periods of time. 
With regard to the first objection, several scholars and some Supreme 
Court Justices have argued that the power not to decide is in fact an important 
attribute of the Court’s authority.  In this view, discretion to decide some 
questions and leave other questions undecided is a key part of the Court’s 
participation in the process of constitutional development, and its primary 
means of agenda-setting in that process.  Descriptively, this is clearly an 
accurate portrayal of the modern Supreme Court, and has been documented 
as such by political scientists.36  It is certainly a power that the Justices 
themselves believe is important.37  But normatively, the idea that the 
Supreme Court’s unelected judges ought to have the power to set an agenda 
for constitutional development is historically recent and theoretically 
problematic.  It is, indeed, flatly inconsistent with the powers of the federal 
judiciary described in the Federalist Papers, and particularly with Alexander 
Hamilton’s famous defense of the courts as the “least dangerous” branch of 
the federal government on grounds that they “can take no active resolution 
whatever” and “may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but 
merely judgment[.]”38 
The absence of discretion in selecting cases was a key feature of this 
early vision of the federal courts.  Indeed, the “duty of giving judgment”39 in 
whatever cases came in over the transom formed an important part of the 
founding justification for the power of judicial review: a court obligated to 
decide the case before it cannot shirk that duty by refusing to announce a 
result compelled by the Constitution.40  As Edward Hartnett put it when 
synthesizing the arguments of scholars such as Alexander Bickel and John 
Harrison, removing the duty to take judicial action while retaining the power 
to do so undermines much of the justification for judicial review, converting 
 
 36  See generally H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991). 
 37  See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 
U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 483–84 (1973) (“The screening function is an inseparable part of the 
whole responsibility . . . . I expect that only a Justice of the Court can know how inseparably 
intertwined are all the Court’s functions, and how arduous and long is the process of 
developing the sensitivity to constitutional adjudication that marks the role.”). 
 38  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).   
 39  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 171 (1803). 
 40  Id. at 177–78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule . . . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and 
the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case 
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, 
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the 
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” (emphasis added)); see also ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 
111–98 (2d ed. 1986). 
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it into “nothing more than a call for mixed government, with one branch—
the judiciary—representing the interests and views of the ‘better’ class of 
society.”41  Whether one feels this call should be answered in the affirmative 
is likely to determine whether one finds this first objection to the “I Choose, 
You Decide” proposal persuasive.  Candidly, I find myself unmoved. 
But even for defenders of the Supreme Court’s institutional authority 
to set the agenda for constitutional development, the “I Choose, You Decide” 
proposal need not be seen as a threat.  All it does is ensure that this authority 
is not exercised in such a way as to give any individual Justice (or group of 
Justices) the authority to ask and answer the agenda-setting question at a 
single stroke.  It need not deprive any individual Supreme Court Justice of 
the prerogative of both choosing which cases warrant Supreme Court review 
and deciding cases as a member of the federal court of last resort.  All it need 
do is prevent any Justice from exercising both powers in the same case.  To 
the extent that arguments in favor of the certiorari regime turn, like Justice 
Brennan’s argument on this point, on the unique responsibility of Supreme 
Court Justices to take a long view of the development of the law,42  “I 
Choose, You Decide” does not threaten that responsibility; it merely divides 
elements of that responsibility up over the course of a Justice’s career. 
The second objection is not so easily addressed.  Partisan misalignment 
between the Certiorari Bench and the Merits Bench might well lead the 
former to deprive the latter of any opportunity to address legal or 
constitutional issues that admit to partisan polarization.  This tendency would 
change the default resolution of such issues from partisan adjudication to no 
adjudication, at least at the Supreme Court level.  Three consequences might 
be predicted to emerge.  First, the authoritative nationwide settlement of 
polarizing issues of federal or constitutional law would likely freeze as of the 
date of adoption of “I Choose, You Decide”—the Court’s most recent 
authoritative statement on such issues as of that date is likely to become its 
last.  Second, to the extent that the inferior federal courts create new rules of 
constitutional or federal law—or, as they have recently shown some appetite 
for doing when they perceive a partisan shift on the Supreme Court,43 issue 
rulings contrary to Supreme Court precedent—those lower court rulings are 
unlikely to be reviewed (or, as the case may be, corrected) by the Merits 
Bench.  Third, to the extent that a circuit split arises on a partisan issue, it is 
 
 41  Hartnett, supra note 21, at 1737.  
 42  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 43  See, e.g., June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018), stayed pending 
application for cert., 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019).  In some instances the lower courts have been 
emboldened to resist Supreme Court mandates within a single case upon a change in 
personnel.  See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(concurring in the Court’s affirmation, following a change in personnel, of its earlier ruling 
in the case, while noting that the Chief Justice had dissented from that earlier ruling). 
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likely to go unresolved, potentially indefinitely.  These three problems would 
likely compound each other: lower courts unhappy with the Supreme Court’s 
final word on a contentious issue might simply defy it, setting up a split with 
other lower courts that adhere to the Supreme Court’s most recent precedent, 
and the resulting circuit split might harden into a persistent difference in the 
application of federal law based on geography for want of Supreme Court 
review.  It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the constitutionality 
of state and federal statutes on issues such as access to abortion, regulation 
of firearms, affirmative action programs, anti-discrimination laws, consumer 
protection measures, religious accommodations, and regulation of elections 
becomes subject to deep and persistent regional division. 
These concerns are substantial.  They go to the core of the Supreme 
Court’s traditionally recognized responsibility to ensure the consistency and 
uniformity of federal law.44  They raise the prospect that the Constitution 
might come to mean one thing in Boston and another in Biloxi, and that the 
economic, political, and social cohesion of the nation might fracture (more 
than it already has) as a result.  Of course, federalism inherently presents 
similar opportunities for regional variation in legal rights and standards, and 
the Union yet endures.  And the potential for a persistent stalemate that 
satisfies neither partisan bloc might lead Justices to engage in horse-trading 
across the divide between the two Benches to allow even partisan issues to 
come to resolution, as they appear to do now in contentious cases.45  Even 
so, the changes to our civic framework that would attend a significant retreat 
of the Supreme Court from our legal and political lives are momentous 
enough that they call out for serious engagement. 
There are some complementary reforms that might mitigate these 
concerns, but such reforms would undermine, at least in part, the counter-
partisan promise of “I Choose, You Decide.”  Most obviously, the Certiorari 
Bench’s discretion to deny the Merits Bench an opportunity to rule on 
 
 44  Though, for a critical review of this aspect of the Court’s role, see generally Amanda 
Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 73 (2008). 
 45  JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN 
ROBERTS 221–48 (2019) (describing negotiation and competition among the Justices for the 
vote of Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius, culminating in a compromise whereby the 
Chief authored an opinion upholding the Affordable Care Act’s individual health insurance 
mandate and Justices Kagan and Breyer joined in a portion of that opinion invalidating in part 
that statute’s program for expanding Medicaid).  This kind of horse-trading might be more 
difficult under “I Choose, You Decide” than it is within the decision of a single case, insofar 
as it requires trust on the part of the Justices who act first in either deciding a case or certifying 
a question that the other Justices will follow through on their side of the deal.  But given the 
long-term, iterative relationship among the Justices, cultivation of such trust does not seem 
implausible.  See generally ELINOR OSTROM & JAMES WALKER, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH (2003) (collecting papers on the 
theory of trust in reciprocal relationships and evidence therefore). 
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partisan issues might be cabined by creating certain classes of mandatory 
appeals.  This approach was part of the Evarts Act, which governed the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction prior to 1925 and preserved appeals 
as of right directly to the Supreme Court in broad categories of cases 
including “capital or otherwise infamous” criminal cases, cases involving the 
construction of the federal constitution or the consistency of a statute with 
that constitution, or cases where the jurisdiction of the federal courts was at 
issue.46  An analogous limitation on discretion was included in the 1972 
Freund Committee proposal for a National Court of Appeals, which would 
have required that court to “retain[] for decision on the merits cases of 
genuine conflict between circuits (except those of special moment, which 
would be certified to the Supreme Court).”47  Alternatively (or in addition), 
the void created by the Supreme Court’s retreat might be filled with the work 
of specialist inferior courts, such as the explicitly specialist Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit or the implicitly specialist Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
But both of these potential solutions create problems of their own.  The 
enumeration of categories of mandatory appeals raises the question of how 
membership in such a category is to be determined (or, more to the point, 
who will have authority to determine it).  This is particularly problematic for 
categories as vaguely defined as, for example, “cases of genuine conflict 
between circuits.”  Moreover, the creation of specialist Article III courts—
which has generated some controversy where it has been attempted48—
simply pushes the problem of partisanship down to those courts, with the 
 
 46  Judiciary Act of 1891 (“Evarts Act”), ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827–28 (1891).  The 
original House version of the Act had specifically required circuit courts to certify an appeal 
to the Supreme Court in diversity actions that presented a circuit split; this specific provision 
was stripped out in the Senate.  Compare id. § 6 (“[T]he judgments or decrees of the circuit 
courts of appeals shall be final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon 
the opposite parties to the suit or controversy, being aliens and citizens of the United States 
or citizens of different States . . . excerpting that in every such subject within its appellate 
jurisdiction the circuit court of appeals at any time may certify to the Supreme Court of the 
United States any questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires the instruction 
of that court for its proper decision.”) with 21 CONG. REC. 3,375, 3,402 (1890) (“That the 
judgments and decrees of the circuit court, in all cases in which jurisdiction is acquired by the 
district court by citizenship of the parties only and in which no question arises under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, shall be final and conclusive, unless the 
circuit court, or two judges thereof, certify to the Supreme Court that the question involved is 
of such novelty, difficulty, or importance as to require a decision by the Supreme Court.  But 
any question shall be so certified upon which there has been a different decision in another 
circuit, in the same manner in which questions were heretofore certified upon which the 
judges holding the circuit courts were divided in opinion, and the Supreme Court shall receive, 
hear, and determine all such questions so certified . . . .”). 
 47  FREUND REPORT, supra note 30, at 47.   
 48  See generally Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal 
Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
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added risk of capture by repeat players in the areas of specialization.49  
Ultimately, any effort to maintain the consistency and uniformity of federal 
law under an “I Choose, You Decide” system comes at the price of upsetting 
that system’s balance of partisanship against partisanship. 
VI. CONCLUSION: WHICH IS THE GREATER EVIL? 
This dilemma requires us to measure up our tolerance for politics 
carried out through the courts and our commitment to uniformity in federal 
law, and to choose which matters most to us in the Supreme Court’s design.  
The alternative to polarizing partisan rulings from the Supreme Court is not 
a less partisan Court, it is a less active one.  We can have a more robust 
Supreme Court, or a less partisan one, but we cannot have both. 
Americans deeply disagree about the best principles upon which to 
build a just society, and about the application of our Constitution to our 
contemporary problems.  That is not in itself a bad thing, but it does require 
us to find a way to live together in the face of such disagreement.  We have 
lately become accustomed to asking the Supreme Court to tell us how to do 
so by choosing a winning side in our partisan debates, even while we reserve 
the privilege of denigrating the Court when it chooses our adversaries over 
us.  If we could ever plausibly have believed that our deep differences would 
dissolve under the guidance of such Supreme Court opinions, we should by 
now have disabused ourselves of such a notion.  By continuing to indulge 
the obvious fiction that the Supreme Court merely calls balls and strikes 
according to rules on which we all agree,50 we will continue to find ourselves 
in the position of Shylock and Gratiano before the incognita Portia: 
obsequiously praising the learning and honor of our judges, but only when 
they rule in our favor.51  If we no longer wish to indulge this charade, we 
must be willing to channel our disagreements into other civic institutions—
and perhaps rejuvenate those institutions so they will be fit for purpose. 
 
 
 49  See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543 (2018); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).  
 50  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing on S. No. J-109-37 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United 
States) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”). 
 51  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. 
